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MILITARY LOGISTICS NETWORK DESIGN VIA AXIOMATIC DESIGN 
PRINCIPLES 
SUMMARY 
As long as there is a conflict of any kind, and weapons are being used by the parties, the 
military is the only organization that can secure interests. In war, the victory does not 
always go to those having the largest army or the most sophisticated equipment. It 
goes to who has more efficient strategic plan. Everything depends on strategic plan: 
when, where and with what forces a battle is to be delivered; in other words on 
logistics how and where to locate. In this study military logistics network is designed 
via axiomatic design principles. In axiomatic design, functional requirements, 
technical side of customer expectations, design parameters to achieve functional 
requirements and mathematical relation between two are studied.  
During logistics network design, it is divided to 4 steps:  acquisition, storage, 
distribution and maintenance.  
 
In acquisition it is important to buy products in required amount and desired features 
to minimum cost at the right time. Cost includes variable product costs, shipping cost 
and fixed costs. In order to decrease cost, consolidation, outsourcing or any step that 
will decrease demand can be used. Price analysis should be made and inventory 
visibility should be maintained. In acquisition, besides cost, it is important to buy 
products in desired features- desired quantity and quality. Demand quantity depends 
on safety stock in peace time and probability of war. Quality not only depends on 
what is available in the market but also depends on enemy‟s‟ quality standards. 
Forecasting, spying and updating product information are necessities. In order to buy 
products at the right time order-management procedures should be developed and 
lead time should be decreased.  
 
Second design step is storage. For strategic mobility framework, some equipment 
should be prepositioned. Instead of long movement of needed equipment, by 
prepositioning it allows combat-ready forces. Managing inventory is one of the key 
features of logistics. Inventory management includes minimization of costs and 
maximization of usage of inventory. Profit maximization and risk minimization 
strategies should be developed to better management. In order to minimize costs, 
fixed costs including fixed assets, administration and selling costs should be 
decreased; inventory levels and movement of inventory in depots should be 
minimized by eliminating non-value added functions as much as possible, inventory 
accuracy and developing inventory allocation strategy. Inventory level minimization 
means minimization in depot inventory, minimization of non-stable inventory (under 
maintenance and in-transit), clarification of pre-positioned equipment quantity and 
minimization of in-theater inventory. Another concern in storage design is to keep 
assets in safe and good conditions.  
 
Third design step is distribution design. The military distribution system has two 
distinct segments: strategic-national and theater. The strategic-national segment 
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consists of moving supplies from points outside a theater of military operations into 
the theater. The theater segment consists of distribution that occurs within a theater 
of military operations. In distribution it is aimed to increase efficiency and decrease 
risk of failure. Performance indicators for transportation are throughput 
maximization, time definite delivery, cost minimization and flexibility. Fundamental 
economic principles impacting transportation economy are economy of scale and 
economy of distance. Transportation costs are driven by distance, volume, density, 
stowability -how product case dimensions fit into transportation equipment-, 
handling, and liability. By flexibility, it is aimed to define a transportation mode 
having high maneuverability, large freight volume, can be used in all weather and 
climatic condition.  In order to increase efficiency transportation methods should be 
optimized. Transportation optimization methods are consolidation, outsourcing, route 
optimization and selecting right transportation mode based on product features, 
quantity and critique. Another important point in distribution is to decide shipping 
priorities: which one, in which order, what quantity, in which conditions, what 
frequency. To solve the problem shipping procedures should be developed based on 
defined criteria.   
 
The last design step is maintenance design. Maintenance is an important aspect of 
military logistics and includes those activities needed to keep weapons, vehicles, and 
other materiel in an operable condition; to restore them to a serviceable condition 
when necessary; or to improve their usefulness through modifications. The Army 
calls maintenance as reset as the repair, recapitalization and replacement of 
equipment to equip units preparing for deployment and improve next-to-deploy 
unit‟s equipment on hand levels. In order to have a customer satisfied maintenance 
function, total cost, risk and required time should be decreased. Cost for repairing are 
shipping, material and personnel costs. Outsourcing, consolidation and decrease 
breakdown-frequency can reduce costs. Speed and the accuracy of repair are other 
issues. 
 
In the study as an example to military system design, documents published by USA 
Department of Defense are used.  
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AKSĠYOMATĠK TASARIM ĠLKELERĠ ĠLE ASKERĠ LOJĠSTĠK AĞI 
TASARIMI 
ÖZET 
İnsanoğlu çıkarlarını devam ettirebilmek, korumak ya da yeni kazanımlar elde etmek 
adına, sürekli savaşmıştır. Teknoloji en çok savaş zamanlarında gelişmiştir. 
Teknoloji geliştikçe, değiştikçe, kendisiyle beraber savaşma yöntemlerini şekillerini 
de değiştirdi. Fakat bu değişimlerin nasıl kullanıldığı savaşı kazananı 
belirlemektedir. Özellikle sahip olunan kaynakları nasıl, nerede, ne miktarda ve ne 
zaman kullanılacağı başarıyı getirmektedir. Askeri lojistik kuvvetlerin ve silahların 
temini, sevkıyatı, koşullandırılması, bakımı ve geri çekilmesini ifade etmektedir.   
Bu çalışmada aksiyomatik tasarım ilkeleri ile askeri lojistik ağı tasarımı yapılmıştır. 
Aksiyomatik tasarım, müşteri ihtiyaçlarının fonksiyonel gereklilikler şeklinde ifade 
edilmesini, fonskiyonel gerekliliklerin gerçekleşmesi için gereken tasarım 
parametrelerini ve bunlar arasındaki matematiksel ifadeyi göstermektedir. Askeri 
lojistik insan ve ekipman lojistiğini içermesine rağmen bu çalışmada sadece ekipman 
lojistiği tasarımı yapılmıştır. Ayrıca savaş meydanındaki lojistik yerine, ulusal 
lojistik olarak da tanımlanan, savaş alanına kadar olan lojistik üzerinde durulmuştur. 
Tasarım dört alt baslıkta yapılmıştır: temin etme, depolama, dağıtım ve bakım-
onarım.  
Satın almada önemli olan müşterinin gereksinim duyduğu ürünü doğru zamanda, 
doğru miktarda uygun fiyata ve istenilen özelliklerde satın almaktır. Maliyet kalemi 
değişken ürün maliyeti, taşıma maliyeti ve sabit maliyetten oluşmaktadır. Maliyeti 
düşürmek için, konsolidasyon, dış kaynak kullanımı ya da talepleri azaltma yollarına 
başvurulabilir. Fiyat analizleri yapılarak ürün değişken fiyatı optimize edilmeye 
çalışılmalıdır. Ayrıca stoktaki ürünlerin özellikleri tam bilinmelidir. Ürün özellikleri 
derken miktar ve kalite kastedilmektedir. Yeni alımlardan önce depodaki ürünler 
kullanılmalı, üründe modifikasyonlar yapılarak istenilen kalite standartlarına 
getirmeye çalışılmalıdır. İstenilen kalite standartları ise olası düşmanın 
ekipmanlarının kalitesine ve miktarına bağlıdır. Bu bilgilerin elde edilmesi için 
casusluk yapılmalı ve elde edilen bilgilerin doğru kullanımı için de çok hassas 
biçimde tahmin etme metodlari geliştirilmelidir.  
Askeri lojistikte en önemli sorunlardan bir tanesi depolama standartlarının 
sağlanamamasıdır. Depolamada maliyetleri düsürmek ve envanter kullanımını 
arttırmak amaçlanmaktadır. Maliyeti azaltmak için dış kaynak kullanımı ya da 
konsolidasyon yöntemleriyle sabit maliyetler ve yönetim maliyetleri düşürülmeli;  
envanter seviyesi ve envanter hareketleri azaltılmalıdır. Envanter seviyesi sadece 
depoda bulunan envanteri değil, taşıma halindeki envanteri, tadilattaki envanteri ve 
savaş alanındaki envanteri de içermektedir. Askeri sistemlerde savaş olasılıklarına 
karşı bazı ekipmanlar tehlike bölgelerine yakın yerlere konumlandırılırlar. Önemli 
olan ne miktarda hangi üründen nerede depolanacağı, bu ürünlerin ne sıklıkta bakıma 
tabi tutulacağı, saklama koşullarının neler olacağıdır.  
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üçüncü basamağı ulaştırma tasarımı oluşturmaktadır. Askeri dağıtım; savaş alanı 
dağıtım ve savaş alanına kadar dağıtım olmak üzere iki kısımdan oluşmaktadır.  
Dağıtımda önemli olan zamanında ve düşük maliyette olmasıdır. Ölçek ekonomisi ve 
mesafe ekonomisi dikkate alınarak maliyet azaltılabilir. Rota optimizasyonu ve 
taşıma yönteminde esneklikler arttırılarak zamanında ulaştırma sağlanabilir.  
En son tasarım basamağı bakım onarım faaliyetleridir. Askerler tarafından sahada 
bakımı yapılamayan ürünler belirli bakım merkezlerine gönderilmektedirler. 
Bakımda önemli olan maliyetlerin düşürülmesi ve riskin azaltılmasıdır. Riskin 
azaltılması için ürünler kısa surede bakımdan geçirilmeli ve tamir edilmeli, tamir 
prosesleri oluşturulmalı ve kontroller sıkı yapılmalıdır. Maliyetleri azaltmak için 
önleyici ve tahmin edici bakim yöntemleri ile ekipmanlardaki bozulmalar 
azaltılabilir. Dış kaynak kullanımı ile yönetim maliyetleri ve personel maliyetleri 
sıfırlanabilir.  
Çalışmada örnek askeri sistem olarak Amerika Birleşik devletleri savunma 
bakanlığının yayımlamış olduğu kaynaklardan faydalanılmıştır.   
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1. INTRODUCTION 
History is full of wars and inventions and methods to gain it. War is an act of 
violence intended to compel opponent to fulfill wills. The aim of all action in war is 
to disarm the enemy [1]. In past general wars were based on human forces. After 
Second World War, as a result of advance in military technology [2], the form of 
wars has changed. Technological advances show themselves in information, 
command& control, penetration and precision [3], weapons, cost effectiveness, target 
acquisition and designation [4]. With all these advances, wars are based on logistics, 
weapon technology, quality of personnel instead of quantity, and true and recent 
information. With new form of war, victory goes who gets forces to be right places at 
the right times, and ensuring that they have the resources needed at the same time 
cutting enemies‟, in other words who has better logistics network.  
1.1 Purpose of the Thesis 
In this study, it is aimed to design a military logistical network: acquisition, 
inventory management, transportation& distribution, and maintenance functions with 
axiomatic design, which is a systems design methodology using matrix methods to 
systematically analyze the transformation of customer needs into functional 
requirements, design parameters, and process variables.  
1.2 Definitions of Military Logistics  
According to Council of Logistics Management, logistics is the part of supply chain 
processes that plans, implements, and controls the efficient effective forward and 
reverse flow and storage of good, services and related information between the points 
of consumption [5]. Specific definitions for logistics of war:  
-Logistics concerns movement and supply: getting forces to the right places at the 
right times, and ensuring that they have the resources needed [6].  
- According to Department of Defense (DoD), logistics is those aspects of military 
operations which deal with: a) design and development, acquisition, storage, 
movement, distribution, maintenance, evacuation and dispotion of materials 
b)movement, evacuation and hospitalization of personnel c)acquisition or 
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construction, maintenance operation, and disposition of facilities d) acquisition or 
furnishing services [5].  
-Logistics consisted of moving and loading the army, and procuring and supplying it 
with all of its needs: food, construction materials, uniforms, arms, munitions, 
animals, major items of equipment, camp equipage, spare parts for all items supplied, 
replacement personnel and medical support [7].  
-According to NATO, logistics is the marshalling and employment of the military 
resources of Nations in support of military operations; embraces the five functions 
of: supply and maintenance, casualty evacuation and hospitalization, movement and 
transportation, construction and facilities, and communications and administrative 
management [8].   
1.3 History of Military Logistics  
 
History is full of wars and inventions and methods to gain it. War is an act of 
violence intended to compel opponent to fulfill wills. The aim of all action in war is 
to disarm the enemy [1]. In past general wars were based on human forces. After 
Second World War, as a result of advance in military technology [2], the form of 
wars has changed. Technological advances show themselves in information, 
command& control, penetration and precision [3], weapons, cost effectiveness, target 
acquisition and designation [4]. With all these advances, wars are based on logistics, 
weapon technology, quality of personnel instead of quantity, and true and recent 
information. By the word information it is denoted all the knowledge about the 
enemy [1].   
 
The earliest known standing army was that of the Assyrians at around 700 BC. They 
had iron weapons, armor and chariots, were well organized and could fight over 
different types of terrain -the most common in the Middle East being desert and 
mountain- and engage in siege operations. The need to feed and equip a substantial 
force of that time, along with the means of transportation (i.e. horses, camels, mules 
and oxen) would mean that it could not linger in one place for too long. The best 
time to arrive in any one spot was just after the harvest, when the entire stock was 
available for requisitioning. Obviously, it was not such a good time for the local 
inhabitants. One of the most intense consumers of grain was the increasing number 
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of animals that were employed by armies of this period. In summer they soon 
overgrazed the immediate area, and unless provision had been made beforehand to 
stockpile supplies or have them bought in, the army would have to move. 
Considerable numbers of followers carrying the materiel necessary to provide 
sustenance and maintenance to the fighting force would provide essential logistic 
support[9]. 
 
Both Philip and Alexander improved upon the art of logistics in their time. Philip 
realized that the vast baggage train that traditionally followed an army restricted the 
mobility of his forces. So he did away with much of the baggage train and made the 
soldiers carry much of their equipment and supplies. He also banned dependants. As 
a result the logistics requirements of his army fell substantially, as the smaller 
numbers of animals required less fodder, and a smaller number of wagons meant less 
maintenance and a reduced need for wood to effect repairs. Added to that, the 
smaller number of cart drivers and lack of dependants, meant less food needed to be 
taken with them, hence fewer carts and animals and there was a reduced need to 
forage, which proved useful in desolate regions. He also made extensive use of 
shipping, with a reasonable sized merchant ship able to carry around 400 tons, while 
a horse could carry 200 lbs. (but needed to eat 20 lbs. of fodder a day, thus 
consuming its own load every ten days). He never spent a winter or more than a few 
weeks with his army on campaign away from a sea port or navigable river [10, 11]. 
He even used his enemy's logistics weaknesses against them, as many ships were 
mainly configured for fighting but not for endurance, and so Alexander would 
blockade the ports and rivers the Persian ships would use for supplies, thus forcing 
them back to base. He planned to use his merchant fleet to support his campaign in 
India, with the fleet keeping pace with the army, while the army would provide the 
fleet with fresh water. However, the monsoons were heavier than usual, and 
prevented the fleet from sailing. Alexander lost two-thirds of his force, but managed 
to get to Gwadar where he re-provisioned. The importance of logistics was central to 
Alexander's plans, indeed his mastery of it allowed him to conduct the longest 
military campaign in history. At the farthest point reached by his army, the river 
Beas in India, his soldiers had marched 11,250 miles in eight years. Their success 
depended on his army's ability to move fast by depending on comparatively few 
animals, by using the sea wherever possible, and on good logistic intelligence [12].  
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The Roman legions used techniques broadly similar to the old methods (large supply 
trains etc.), however, some did use those techniques pioneered by Phillip and 
Alexander, most notably the Roman consul Marius. The Romans' logistics were 
helped of course, by the superb infrastructure, including the roads they built as they 
expanded their empire. However, with the decline in the Western Roman Empire in 
the Fifth Century AD, the art of warfare degenerated, and with it, logistics was 
reduced to the level of pillage and plunder. It was with the coming of Charlemagne, 
that provided the basis for feudalism, and his use of large supply trains and fortified 
supply posts called 'burgs', enabled him to campaign up to 1,000 miles away, for 
extended periods. The eastern Roman (Byzantine) Empire did not suffer from the 
same decay as its western counterpart. It adopted a defensive strategy, which 
Clausewitz recognized as being easier logistically than an offensive strategy, and that 
expansion of territory is costly in men and material. Thus in many ways their 
logistics problems were simplified - they had interior lines of communication, and 
could shift base far easier in response to an attack, than if they were in conquered 
territory, an important consideration, due to their fear of a two-front war. They used 
shipping and considered it vital to keep control of the Dardanelles, Bosphorous and 
Sea of Marmara; and on campaign made extensive use of permanent warehouses, or 
magazines, to supply troops. Hence, supply was still an important consideration, and 
thus logistics were fundamentally tied up with the feudal system - the granting of 
patronage over an area of land, in exchange for military service. A peacetime army 
could be maintained at minimal cost by essentially living off the land, useful for 
Princes with little hard currency, and allowed the man-at-arms to feed himself, his 
family and retainers from what he grew on his own land and given to him by the 
peasants[13]. 
 
The fighting ships of antiquity were limited by the lack of endurance while the broad 
beamed seaworthy merchant ships were unsuited to the tactics of the time that were 
practiced in the Mediterranean. It wasn't until the Europeans put artillery on-board 
such vessels that they combined the fighting and logistic capability in one vessel and 
thus became instruments of foreign policy with remarkable endurance and hitting 
power. They reached the zenith of their potential during the Napoleonic Wars, but 
with the conversion to coal and steam power, a ship's endurance was once again 
limited. But they could still carry their ammunition and supplies farther and faster, 
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and were thus more logistically independent than horse-powered armies, despite the 
need for coaling stations. Fuel oil increased endurance by forty percent, but that was 
due to its greater efficiency as a fuel source. The coming of the fleet train and 
underway replenishment techniques during the Second World War enhanced the 
endurance of modern navies massively, and ships could thus stay at sea for months, 
if not years, especially with the reduced time between dockyard maintenance 
services. The coming of nuclear power once again extended the sea-going life of a 
vessel, with endurance limited to that of the crew and the systems that need a 
dockyard to be overhauled. 
The appeal by Emperor Alexius to the Pope for help in clearing Anatolia of the Turks 
in 1095 paved the way for a series of Western European military expeditions which 
have become known as the Crusades. As a result of these, the Western Europeans 
significantly advanced their practice of the military arts [15].  
 
The First World War was unlike anything that had gone before it. Not only did the 
armies initially outstrip their logistic systems with the amount of men, equipment and 
horses moving at a fast pace, but they totally underestimated the ammunition 
requirements. On average, ammunition was consumed at ten times the pre-war 
estimates, and the shortage of ammunition became serious, forcing governments to 
vastly increase ammunition production. In Britain this caused the 'shell scandal' of 
1915, but rather than the government of the day being to blame, it was faulty pre-war 
planning, for a campaign on the mainland of Europe, for which the British were 
logistically unprepared. Once the war became trench bound, supplies were needed to 
build fortifications that stretched across the whole of the Western Front. Add to that 
the scale of the casualties involved, the difficulty in building up for an attack 
(husbanding supplies) and then sustaining the attack once it had gone in (if any 
progress was made, supplies had to be carried over the morass of no-man's land). It 
was no wonder that the war in the west was conducted at a snail's pace, given the 
logistic problems. It was not until 1918, that the British, learning the lessons of the 
last four years, finally showed how an offensive should be carried out, with tanks and 
motorised gun sleds helping to maintain the pace of the advance, and maintain 
supply well away from the railheads and ports. The First World War was a milestone 
for military logistics. It was no longer true to say that supply was easier when armies 
kept on the move due to the fact that when they stopped they consumed the food, fuel 
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and fodder needed by the army. From 1914, the reverse applied, because of the huge 
expenditure of ammunition, and the consequent expansion of transport to lift it 
forward to the consumers. It was now far more difficult to resupply an army on the 
move, while the industrial nations could produce huge amounts of war matériel, the 
difficulty was in keeping the supplies moving forward to the consumer.  
 
This of course, was a foretaste of the Second World War. The conflict was global in 
size and scale. Not only did combatants have to supply forces at ever greater 
distances from the home base, but these forces tended to be fast moving, and 
voracious in their consumption of fuel, food, water and ammunition. Railways again 
proved indispensable, but sealift and airlift made ever greater contributions as the 
war dragged on. The large-scale use of motorised transport for tactical re-supply 
helped maintain the momentum of offensive operations, and most armies became 
more motorised as the war progressed. The Germans, although moving to greater use 
of motorised transport, still relied on horse transport to a large extent - a fact worth 
noting in the failure of Barbarossa. After the fighting had ceased, the operations 
staffs could relax somewhat, whereas the logisticians had to supply not only the 
occupation forces, but also relocate those forces that were demobilising, repatriate 
Prisoners Of War, and feed civil populations of often decimated countries. The 
Second World War was, logistically, as in every other sense, the most testing war in 
history. The cost of technology had not yet become an inhibiting factor, and only its 
industrial potential and access to raw materials limited the amount of equipment, 
spares and consumables a nation could produce. In this regard, the United States 
outstripped all others. Consumption of war material was never a problem for the 
USA and its allies. Neither was the fighting power of the Germans diminished by 
their huge expenditure of war material, nor the strategic bomber offensives of the 
Allies. They conducted a stubborn, often brilliant defensive strategy for two-and-a-
half years, and even at the end, industrial production was still rising. The principal 
logistic legacy of the Second World War was the expertise in supplying far off 
operations and a sound lesson in what is, and what is not, administratively possible 
[16].   
 
With the end of the Second World War, the tensions that had been held in check by 
the common goal to defeat fascism finally came to the fore. The Cold War started in 
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around 1948 and was given impetus by the Berlin Blockade, the formation of NATO 
and the Korean War. The period was characterised by the change in the global order, 
from one dominated by empires to a roughly bipolar world, split between the 
Superpowers and their alliance blocs. However, the continued activity by both blocs 
in the Third World meant that both sides continued to draw on the experience of 
power projection from the Second World War. East and West continued to have to 
prepare for both limited conflicts in the Third World, and an all-out confrontation 
with the other bloc. These would vary between 'low intensity' counter-insurgency 
conflicts (Vietnam, Central America, Malaya, Indochina and Afghanistan) and 
'medium intensity' conventional operations (Korea, the Falklands) often conducted 
well away from the home base and an all-out Third World War involving high-
intensity conventional and / or nuclear conflict. Both sides had to deal with the 
spiralling rate of defence inflation, while weapon systems increased in both cost and 
complexity, having implications for the procurement process, as defence budgets 
could not increase at the same rate.   
 
The principal concern for the defence planners of the two blocs involved the stand 
off between NATO and the Warsaw Pact in Europe. The history of the two alliances 
is closely linked. Within a few years of the end of the Second World War, relations 
between East and West became increasingly strained to the point of becoming the 
Cold War and a dividing line being drawn across Europe. The Soviet inspired coup 
in Czechoslovakia, the Greek Civil war and the Berlin Blockade all suggested to the 
Western nations that the Soviets wished to move the Iron Curtain westwards, which 
was combined with the Soviet failure to demobilise on a par with the West. Initially, 
the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in April 1949 building upon the Brussels Treaty 
of 1948, and was signed by the United Kingdom, France, United States, Canada, 
Belgium, Netherlands, Denmark, Norway, Portugal, Iceland, Italy and Luxembourg. 
The outbreak of the Korean War (in June 1950) and the early test of a Soviet nuclear 
device in August 1949 led to fears of a major expansion in Soviet activity. This 
prompted the Alliance into converting itself into a standing military organisation, 
necessitating the stockpiling of large amounts of munitions, equipment and spares; 
"just in case" it was needed. The original members were joined in 1952 by Greece 
and Turkey, by West Germany in 1955 and by Spain in 1982.  
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NATO strategy, by the late 1980s, was based around the concepts of "flexible 
response", "forward defence" and "follow on force attack". The key element of 
NATO strategy, that of "flexible response", was adopted in 1967, and took over from 
"massive retaliation". This strategy demanded a balance of conventional and nuclear 
forces sufficient to deter aggression, and should deterrence fail, be capable of actual 
defence. The three stages in response to aggression were "direct defence" (defeating 
the enemy attack where it occurs and at the level of warfare chosen by the 
aggressor), "deliberate escalation" (escalating to a level of warfare, including the use 
of nuclear weapons, to convince the aggressor of NATO's determination and ability 
to resist and hence persuade them to withdraw) and "general nuclear response" (the 
use of strategic nuclear weapons to force the aggressor to halt his attack). A key 
commitment has been to "forward defence" (in deference to German political 
interests), that is, trying to maintain a main front line as close to the Iron Curtain as 
possible. To this had been added "FOFA" (follow-on-force attack), derived from the 
US Army's "AirLand Battle 2000" strategy where "smart" and "stealth" weapons  are 
used to attack enemy rear areas and approaching forces. For forty years, the main 
threat to NATO's territorial integrity was the armed forces of the Soviet Union and 
Warsaw Treaty Organization, more commonly known as the Warsaw Pact. This 
organization came into being on the 14th May 1955 with the signing of the Treaty of 
Friendship, Cooperation and Mutual Assistance by Albania, Bulgaria, 
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Hungary, Poland, Rumania, and of course the 
USSR. This was supposedly a response to the rearming of West Germany and its 
incorporation into NATO. The treaty reinforced a number of bilateral mutual aid 
treaties between the USSR and its allies, which was also complemented by a series of 
status force agreements allowing for the positioning of substantial Soviet forces on 
the allies' soil. The original treaty was valid until May 1975 where it was renewed for 
ten years and again in May 1985 for twenty years. The purpose of the Pact was to 
facilitate the Soviet forces to defend the Soviet Union and to threaten Western 
Europe, while extracting military assistance from the East European states. The East 
Europeans were "reluctant to make all the military efforts demanded of them, and 
have from time to time, resisted Soviet attempts to extract more resources, and 
refused to undertake all the exercises demanded or even on occasions, to lend full 
blooded diplomatic support" [9].  As a consequence, the dependability of the Pact 
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forces in a war may have been open to question. Much would have depended upon 
the nature of the conflict.  
 
Warsaw Pact doctrine called for a broad frontal assault while securing massive 
superiority at a few preselected points. The attacking forces would be echeloned, 
possibly three or more echelons. To the Pact, only the offensive was decisive. The 
concept of defence was used as a means to shield reorganising forces getting ready to 
launch another offensive. Pact formations were modular all the way up to Front level 
(each Front consisted of two to five Armies, but generally consisted of three). One 
Pact Army was configured similarly to another Army (each Army was made up of 
from three to seven Divisions but generally consisted of four or five Divisions). 
Forces in the front echelon would punch holes in NATO's front line for the 
Operational Manoeuvre Groups and the second echelon to exploit through and 
hopefully lead to the collapse of the NATO main line position. The third echelon 
would then pursue the fleeing enemy forces and complete the assigned objectives 
[17, 18, 19].   
 
It must be noted however, that as structured, the Pact was not intended to be used in 
wartime. The Pact was meant to support the stationing of the various Groups of 
Soviet Forces, control training and exercises, assist in operational effectiveness and 
supervise and control military policy. The East European national armies were 
trained and equipped on the Soviet model because in war they would have been fully 
integrated into the Soviet Command structure as parts of the various Fronts. The 
logistic implications of a clash between these two giants would have been enormous.  
Despite its high ideals, NATO had a number of drawbacks, the most serious of which 
was its lack of sustainability. In a major shooting war, so long as the Soviets 
performed reasonably well, NATO would probably have lost due to the fact it would 
have run out of things with which to fight. In a static war, logistics is somewhat 
simpler in the modern age, as ammunition can be stocked and fuel expenditure is 
limited. In a highly mobile war, the main consumable used will be fuel rather than 
ammunition, but in a highly attritional conflict, the reverse will apply. Ammunition 
will be used to a larger extent than fuel. For example, Soviet tank armies advancing 
at a rate of between sixteen and forty-five kilometers a day in 1944 - 5 suffered far 
lower losses in men and tanks and consumed a third less fuel and one sixth the 
10 
 
ammunition of tank armies that advanced at a rate of between four and thirteen 
kilometers a day [10]. Of course, this requirement will have to be modified to take 
account of what Clausewitz termed the 'friction of war' - terrain, weather, problems 
with communications, misunderstood orders etc. not to mention the actions of the 
enemy.  
 
NATO reinforcement and resupply had been coordinated under SACEUR's (Supreme 
Allied Commander, Europe) Rapid Reinforcement Plan, and could be expected to 
work if given adequate time. However, there were possible clashes in that, for 
example, if the United Kingdom decided to exercise its national option of reinforcing 
BAOR (British Army of the Rhine) with the 2nd Infantry Division, its arrival may 
coincide with the arrival of the III US Corps from CONUS (Continental United 
States) to draw their equipment from the POMCUS (Pre-positioned Overseas 
Material Configured in Unit Sets) sites and thus cause major logistic problems given 
the lack of rolling stock to go around. So, paradoxically, the greater the success the 
United States had in reinforcing Europe, the greater probability there would have 
been clashes in priority. The plan depended upon NATO forces limiting the expected 
interference from theb enemy (something the Warsaw Pact definitely planned on 
doing) and kind weather - only then would the plan have had a good chance of 
succeeding. Given the extended supply lines from the Channel ports across the Low 
Countries and the lack of operational coordination, either in defensive tactics or 
logistics one is left to wonder. For example, if one corps' national logistic capability 
became critical, the Army Group headquarters may have recommended a transfer of 
stocks between National Logistic Support Commands. If the national authorities 
refused to transfer stocks then the Army Group Commander would have to refer the 
decision to the Commander-in-Chief Central Region (CINCENT) who would then 
negotiate with the Ministries of Defence concerned. Tactical and logistic 
responsibility was thus separated and command was divided. CINCENT or the Army 
Group Commanders had no power to reallocate nationally provided operational 
support capabilities or resources, and did not have access to logistic information that 
would have helped them make decisions on redeployment or reinforcement. As 
logistics was a national responsibility, each national corps has a set of 'tramlines' that 
ran westwards. Cross corps-boundary logistics was difficult, if not impossible. While 
routes for such operations had been thought out, there were three different tank gun 
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ammunition types, different fuzing and charge arrangements for artillery 
ammunition, different fuel resupply methods and no interoperable logistic support 
system for airmobile operations. All this would mitigate against a cohesive Army 
Group battle, particularly in the Northern Army Group. Thus sustainability would 
have been the NATO achilles' heel. While the agreed stock level was to thirty days, 
many nations did not stock even to this. All have different ways of arriving at Daily 
Ammunition Expenditure Rates. Most members had either non-existent or not 
published plans to gear up their industrial base to replace the stocks once used. As 
experience in the Falklands War points out, actual ammunition expenditure rates 
would have been far above those planned [10]. It is also worth remembering that one 
British armoured division would have needed around 4,000 tons of ammunition of all 
types per day.   
 
The Soviets (and hence Warsaw Pact) view was that while a short war was 
preferable, it was possible that the conflict might last some time and stay 
conventional. There is no such word as 'sustainability' in Russian, the closest being 
'viability'. This has a much broader context, and includes such matters as training, the 
quality and quantity of weapons and equipment, and the organization of fighting 
units, as well as supply, maintenance, repair and reinforcements. The Soviets also 
relied on a scientific method of battle planning; one that took into account military 
history, to reduce uncertainty to a minimum and to produce detailed quantitative 
assessments of battlefield needs. They also had a common military doctrine 
throughout the Warsaw Pact and standard operational procedures.  Soviet forces still 
relied on a relatively streamlined logistic tail as compared to their Western 
counterparts. The bulk of logistic resources were held at Army and Front level, 
which could supply two levels down if required. This gave a false indication to the 
West of the logistic viability of the Soviet division. Thus senior commanders had a 
great deal of flexibility in deciding who to support and who to abandon and which 
axis to concentrate on. Soviet priorities for resupply, in order, were ammunition, 
POL, spares and technical support, food and medical supplies and clothing. They 
regarded fuel as the greatest challenge, but their rear services could still make 
maximum use of local resources, be it clothing, food or fuel. It is probable though 
that the Soviets would not have had things all their own way. Keeping a high tempo 
of operations would consume large amounts of fuel and ammunition. Thus almost 
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every town and wood in East Germany and Czechoslovakia would have become a 
depot and every road or track would have been needed to transport it and every 
possible means to carry it utilised, including captured vehicles. NATO would of 
course be trying to interdict these supply routes and the density of forces would have 
made traffic control problematic, not to mention the fact that any significant advance 
would place the leading forces well away from their supply bases and railheads 
behind the initial start line. However, the Soviets would endeavor to maintain strict 
control over supply priorities and a ruthless determination to achieve the objective. 
To this end, surprise would have been vital, and thus the objectives should have been 
achievable with forces in being, with the minimum amount of reinforcement. Also, 
the first strategic echelon would have been required to maintain operations over a 
longer period of time. There would thus be no secure rear areas, no forward edge of 
the battle area or front line. The repair and medical services would thus be positioned 
well forward, giving priority to men and equipment that can be tended to quickly and 
sent back into action. The Soviets did not have a 'use and throwaway' attitude to men 
and equipment, but intended to keep the fighting strength of the unit as high as 
possible for as long as possible. Once the formation had become badly mauled 
however, it would be replaced by a fresh one - they did not believe in the Western 
method of replacing unit casualties with reinforcements thus keeping the unit in 
action over a prolonged period.   
 
The ending of the Cold War has had profound effects upon the philosophy of, and 
approach to military logistics. The long held approach of stock-piling of weapons, 
ammunition and vehicles, at various strategic sites around the expected theatre of 
operations and in close proximity to the lines of communications was possible when 
the threat and its axes of attack were known. It is no longer the optimum method in 
the new era of force projection and manoeuvre warfare. 'High tech' weapons are also 
difficult to replace, as the US Air Force demonstrated during the 1999 attacks on 
Yugoslavia, when they started to run short of cruise missiles. With pressure on 
defence budgets and the need to be able to undertake a (possibly larger) number of 
(smaller) operational roles than had previously been considered there has been a 
closer examination of the approach of commercial organizations to logistics. For the 
UK, this pressure has been particularly intense and as part of the Strategic Defence 
Review (1998) the Smart Procurement Initiative was announced. This was designed 
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not only to improve the acquisition process but also to bring about more effective 
support in terms of supply and engineering. However, it is pertinent at this point, to 
briefly examine what commercial practices are being considered.  
Just after the Second World War, the United States provided considerable assistance 
to Japan. Out of this, the Japanese have become world leaders in management 
philosophies that bring about the greatest efficiency in production and service. From 
organisations such as Toyota came the then revolutionary philosophies of Just In 
Time (JIT) and Total Quality Management (TQM). From these philosophies have 
arisen and developed the competitive strategies that world class organisations now 
practice. Aspects of these that are now considered normal approaches to management 
include kaizen (or continuous improvement), improved customer-supplier 
relationships, supplier management, vendor managed inventory, customer focus on 
both the specifier and user, and above all recognition that there is a supply chain 
along which all efforts can be optimised to enable effective delivery of the required 
goods and services. This means a move away from emphasising functional 
performance and a consideration of the whole chain of supply as a total process. It 
means a move away from the 'silo' mentality to thinking and managing 'outside the 
(functional) box'. In both commercial and academic senses the recognition of supply 
chain management, as an enabler of competitive advantage is increasingly to the 
fore. This has resulted in key elements in being seen as best practice in their own 
right, and includes value for money, partnering, strategic procurement policies, 
integrated supply chain / network management, total cost of ownership, business 
process reengineering, and outsourcing.  
 
The total process view of the supply chain necessary to support commercial business 
is now being adopted by, and adapted within, the military environment. Military is 
different from private sector [17]. Although it uses best practises of private sector, 
economy concept and risk meanings are different. In private sector economy is 
gained via cost and time minimization. Quality is one of the determinants. It is aimed 
to minimize storage. On the other hand, because of life risk in military, in order to 
preserve sustainability and continuity, some items are stored. Economy is in the 
second order. Quality is having the materials to continue to survive.    
Hence initiatives such as 'Lean Logistics' and 'Focussed Logistics" as developed the 
US Department of Defense and acknowledged by the UK Ministry of Defence in the 
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so-called Smart Procurement, recognise the importance of logistics within a 'cradle to 
grave' perspective. This means relying less on the total integral stockholding and 
transportation systems, and increasing the extent to which contractorised logistic 
support to military operations is fanned out to civilian contractors - as it was in the 
eighteenth century.  
 
Force projection and manoeuvre warfare blur the distinction between the long held 
first, second and third line support concept of the static Cold War philosophy and 
link the logistics' supply chain more closely with the home base than ever before.  
One of the reasons for the defeat of the British in the American colonies in 1776 may 
have been the length of, and time involved in, replenishing the forces from a home 
base some 3,000 miles away. The same was true in the Russo-Japanese War with a 
4,000-mile supply line along a single-track railway [20]. Whilst the distances 
involved may still be great in today's operational environment, logistic philosophies 
and systems are being geared to be more responsive in a way that could not have 
been previously envisaged.   
1.4 Advances in Form of War 
All of the advances mentioned above showed themselves as war-form changes. For 
nearly 400 years, large scale conventional war has been the most strategically 
significant form of arm conflict [20]. Now we are talking about information war 
(IW), electronic war (EW), hi-tech war (HW), parallel war (PW) and unconventional 
war.   
In hi-tech warfare, tactical effectiveness no longer depends on the size of forces or 
extends   of firepower and motorized forces; but more on control systems over the 
war theater and efficiency in utilizing information from the theater [3].  
Electronic war is any military action involving the use of the electromagnetic 
spectrum to include directed energy to control electromagnetic spectrum or to attack 
enemy. It is a force multiplier. When its actions are integrated with other military 
operations, a synergistic effect is achieved, losses minimized and effectiveness 
enhanced [21].   
In parallel war all forces simultaneously attack enemy centers of gravity across all 
levels of war (strategic, operational and tactical) at rates faster than the enemy can 
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repair and adopt. The overall goal is paralysis of the enemy through shock. It 
requires highly precise weapons directed against vital targets [3].   
Aim of information war is to destroy the national information network of the enemy. 
Certain innate features of IW are battlefield transparency, overall coordination, 
operations in real time and precision strike [22]. To be able to fight in IW nations 
should improve and protect C
4
I systems (command, control, communications, 
computers, and intelligence systems) by decentralizing [3, 4, and 22] and destroy 
enemies‟. In Desert Storm first command and control structure was systematically 
destroyed, followed by attacks against critical elements of the infrastructure. In short 
order Baghdad could not communicate with the troops in the field and the supply 
lines were cut off [23]. Information age armies will know where their own forces and 
enemies are and distribute this information among the forces of all dimensions- sea, 
land, air and space [3]. In order to be successful in IW, destroying enemies‟ 
information system is not enough, but also having a mobile and flexible database is a 
must. To adopt IW needs, changes in military makeup will experience the following 
trends [22]:  
 naval and air force troops will grow  
 the ratio of army troops will decline 
 technical support will grow, while rear logistic support will decline 
 new staff like computer soldiers  
In conventional war, enemies are peers. But because of technological advances like 
mass destruction weapons, small parties levy war on bigger countries [2, 3]. 
Unconventional war is the war not against military forces of one country but an 
irregular war against terrorist cells [24]. Guerilla wars can be given as an example. 
Troops in Aphganistan operates in small units to function behind enemy lines, 
develop and coordinate guerrilla force, conduct direct action strikes against 
designated targets [23]. Guerilla tactics generally have objectives: 1) they sap the 
strength of a regular army until they can defeat it in conventional war 2) they aim to 
provoke the government into retailing indiscriminately, harming innocent civilians in 
the process and so increasing popular support for insurgents [25].  
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In fact, all form changes make wars become more deadly, more capital intensive and 
longer range [4] by changing the way of fighting [22]: 
 battle space will be extended to hundreds or several thousand kilometers 
 the front and rear of the battle field will be attacked simultaneously 
 the strategic rear area might be first target to attack 
 time and speed will have new meanings 
 enemy C4I systems and high threat weapons will be the main targets 
 information attacks and firepower will be combined 
 The destructions of numerous enemy forces will no longer be the primary   
      task.  
 Warfare cannot be carried out by a simple adjustment in the structure of the  
army but will be a network formed by land, sea, air and space forces. Space  
forces are ultrasonic weapons, laser weapons and high frequency weapons.  
1.5 Military Logistics Literature 
 
Although there are lots of books written about military, a minority of them give 
importance to logistics. After Iraq War, by the transformation of USA military 
logistics, new books and academic papers are published:  
 The oldest information is belonged to Sun tzu. It gives general tactics to 
warriors that can be used in business world [26].  
 Leonard studied on Clausewitz book [27].   
 In his book, Huston studies how logistics strategy of NATO is planned [28]. 
 Pillsburg published papers of Chinese commanders written about future 
warfare: technology, military structure, logistics and weapons [29].  
 In his book, Pitney expresses how to use politics to win wars [30].  
 Megargee works on Hitlers commanders and structure [31].  
 In his paper Kiley gives example how USA military uses private sector 
supply tactics [32]. 
 Colonel John Alexander studies which and how advanced weapons should be 
used after September 11 in Iraq and Afghanistan [33]. 
 Gansler and Luby studied about USA military supply chain transformation to 
meet new age request [34].  
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 In his book Mockaitis examines Iraq war, what the failures were, what should 
be done for future security and warfare [35].  
 On his paper, Cardinali asks what is best for military logistics: outsourcing 
because of its economy and efficiency or privatization because of security.   
[36] 
 
Thesis studies and their topics are:  
 Smith studied the logistical support to the US army during the war with 
Mexico 1845-1847 [37].  
 Arikan studied the Israel Defense Forces‟ (IDF) transformation in the context 
of the U.S. military transformation [38]. 
 Alcide examined the U.S. Army‟s Single Stock Fund (SSF) program, which 
is a business process initiative designed to reengineer the inventory 
management, finance, and accounting systems and to enable 49 general 
ledgers accounts Army-wide [39]. 
 Maddox focused on what strategic organizational structures should exist 
within the Department of Defense to facilitate further integration of the 
defense supply chain. [40] 
After 1995, USA military department of defense started to study on its logistics 
process and published events and ideas quarterly.  
 
1.6 Design Methodology 
 
In this study, logistics is designed via axiomatic design principles under these 
subtitles: acquisition, storage, transpotation& distribution and maintenance.    
 
During design there are some important points:  
 Logistics is designed by the assumption of knowing the geography of war 
well, because it is the geography that shapes logistics. Geography consists of 
natural features such as rivers, climatic circumstances such as temperature, 
and artificial structures such as roads and buildings. It also includes human 
circumstances where different kinds of people live and work [41].  Different 
geography requires different kinds of equipment and poses different 
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challenges to supply lines.  For example during World War II, because of 
different structure of Russian Railways, Germans had difficulty to move 
supply trains [42].  
 Logistics begins with time and money. In the study it is assumed that the 
forces have enough time and money.  
 War is conventional. Although the future battlefield expands the concept of 
armed conflict by placing the operational aspects within a broader context to 
include political, economic, social, ecological, demographic, legal, 
normative, diplomatic and technological [20].   
 Logistics design is made for material. It does not include human factor.  
 Active defense is taken as defense wars. It requires the organic integration of 
offense and defense, and achieving the strategic goal of defense by active 
offense, when the condition is ripe, the strategic defense should be led to 
counter attack and offense [22] 
 Only outbound logistics is studied due to fact that battle field supply line is 
shortened while the strategic supply line is relatively extended [22].  
During design process, it aimed to have rapid delivery, light government inventories, 
operational integration, functional integration, enterprise integration, predictive 
intervention, robust information security, customer driven processes, continuous 
review and improvement [5].  
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2. AXIOMATIC DESIGN & PRINCIPLES 
2.1 Principles of Axiomatic Design 
 
Axioms are general principles which are evident actualities that cannot be proven to 
be correct but which do not have counter examples [43].  AD principles developed to 
form systematic scientific basis for designers, especially in the design processes of 
product, production systems, and software design are widely used to solve many 
design problems. These principles present better design solutions in the shortest time 
as they provide a systematic research process in a design space which becomes 
complicated with customer needs. Design axioms provide a rational means for 
evaluating the quality of proposed designs, and the design process which is used 
guides designers to consider alternatives at all levels of detail and to makes choices 
between these alternatives more explicit [44].  
 
The world of design is made up of four domains: the customer domain, the functional 
domain, the physical domain, and the process domain. The domain on the left 
relative to the domain on the right represents “what we want to achieve”, whereas the 
domain on the right represents the design solution of “how we propose to satisfy the 
requirements specified in the left domain”.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Design mapping process 
 
Physical 
domain 
Customer 
domain 
CA 
Function
al domain 
FR 
Process 
domain 
DP 
PV 
Mapping 
20 
 
The customer domain is characterized by customer needs (or the attributes) the 
customer is looking for in a product, process or system. In the functional domain, the 
customer needs are specified in terms of functional requirements (FRs) and 
constraints (Cs). In order to satisfy the specified FRs, we conceive a design described 
by design parameters (DPs) in the physical domain. Finally, to produce the design 
product specified in terms of DPs, we develop a process that is characterized by 
process variables (PVs) in the process domain. 
 
Axioms are widely accepted principles which are the fundamental concepts of 
mapping process. The first design axiom is known as the Independence Axiom and 
the second axioms is known as the Information Axiom; and are stated as follows 
[43]: 
Axiom 1. The Independence Axiom: Maintain the independence of functional 
requirements. 
Axiom 2. The Information Axiom: Minimize the information content. 
 
Independence axiom states that, during the mapping process from the functional 
requirements (FRs) in the functional domain to the design parameters (DPs) in the 
physical domain, a change in a particular DP must affect only its referent FR. 
According to the information axiom, among all the feasible designs that satisfy the 
independence axiom, the one with the minimum information content is the best 
design [44] . 
 
The mapping process between the domains can be expressed mathematically in terms 
of the characteristic vectors that define the design goals and the design solutions. At 
a given level of the design hierarchy, the set of functional requirements that define 
the specific design goals constitutes a vector {FRs} in the functional domain. 
Similarly, the set of design parameters constitutes a vector {DPs}. The relationship 
between these two vectors can be written as: 
{FRs}= [A] {DPs} where [A] is defined as the design matrix that characterizes the 
design and shows the relationships between the FRs and DPs at a given level of the 
design hierarchy. 
 
21 
 
To satisfy the independence axiom, the design matrix must be either diagonal or 
triangular. When the design matrix [A] is diagonal, each of the FRs can be satisfied 
independently by means of one DP. Such a design is called uncoupled design. When 
[A] is triangular, the independence of FRs can be guaranteed if and only if the DPs 
are changed in a proper sequence. Such a design is called decoupled design. Any 
other matrix is known as a coupled design. In equations 2.1, 2.2, and 2.3, an X 
represents a strong effect by a DP on a FR, while a zero indicates a weak effect, 
relative to the tolerance associated with the FR. 
 
                                                     (2.1) 
 
                                               (2.2) 
 
                                              (2.3) 
 
Information Axiom which is the second axiom of AD principles is about minimizing 
the information content of the design. In other words, among all the proposed 
solutions that satisfy independence axiom, the best design is the design that has the 
minimum information content. Information axiom provides a conventional method to 
asses the designs to select the best one. The selection process is based on criterion 
which states that the design resulting in the highest probability of FR success is the 
best design [45]. If the probability of success for a given FR is p, the information 
content is calculated by 
 
                                                                                                              (2.4) 
 
If there is more than one FR, the information content is calculated as follows [43,45]: 
 
                                                                                          (2.5) 
 
22 
 
The methodology of axiomatic design can be summarized as follows [43]:  
Step 1. Determine the experts. While determining the expert group, the 
potential user population of the designed product must be taken into 
consideration. 
Step 2. Define FRs in the functional domain. In this step, to define design 
parameters, functional requirements are determined to satisfy customer 
needs.  
Step 3. Define DPs in the physical domain. Design parameters/ criteria are 
defined to satisfy the defined FRs. 
Step 4. Decompose of FRs and DPs. FRs and DPs at the top level are 
decomposed until to obtain applicable design parameters. 
Step 5. Construct the design matrix and evaluate the relations between FRs 
and DPs. 
2.2 Literature of Logistics Design via Axiomatic Design Principles  
 
The method is developed by Suh. Based on the literature review studied by Kulak et 
al, it is mentioned that [46]: 
 High majority of studies is based on indepence axiom instead of information 
axiom.  
 Axiomatic design principles are generally used for product design.  
 Instead of fuzzy evaluation, crisp design is preferred. 
 The list of logistics and supply chain related axiomatic design publications are:  
 On their graduation project, Ozel and Ozyoruk used fuzzy axiomatic design 
principles for supplier selection [47]. 
 Favaro used indepence axiom by crisp evaluation to develop a lean logistics 
design methodology [48]. 
 On their paper, Schnetzler developed a method of supply chain design 
decomposition (SCDD) that distinguishes objectives and means of SCM [49]. 
 On their paper Celik et al, propose a hybrid approach on ensuring the 
competitiveness requirements for major Turkish container ports by utilizing 
fuzzy axiomatic design (FAD) and fuzzy technique for order performance by 
similarity to ideal solution (TOPSIS) methodologies to manage strategic 
decision-making with incomplete information [50]  
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 On their paper Kulak and Kahraman developed a Fuzzy multi-attribute 
selection among transportation companies using axiomatic design and 
analytic hierarchy process[51]. 
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3. MATERIAL LOGISTICS NETWORK 
Because of changing format of war, defense departments started to develop new 
logistics concepts. In 2004 Dod issued logistic transformation strategy. The guidance 
directed to reconcile 3 logistics concepts [52]:  
 Force centric logistic enterprise 
 Sense and respond logistics 
 Focused logistics 
Force centric logistics enterprise is a concept for enhancing support to war fighter 
and it encompasses 6 initiatives:  
 Depot maintenance partnership  
 Condition-bases maintenance  
 Total life cycle systems management 
 End-to-end distribution (The End-to-End Distribution initiative is directed 
toward streamlining war fighter support by providing materiel, including 
retrograde and associated information, from the source of supply or point of 
origin to the point of use or disposal, as defined by the CINC, Military 
Service, or characteristics of the commodity, on a worldwide basis. The 
intent of the initiative is to influence acquisition, sourcing, positioning, and 
transportation to facilitate the flow of materiel to the end user, ensuring that 
deployment and sustainment are synchronized)  
 Executive agents 
 Enterprise integration  
Sense and respond logistics is a future concept envisioning a networked logistics 
system that would provide joint strategic and tactical operations with predictive, 
precise and agile support [53]. It calls for a transformation from a sole focus on 
prediction and inward optimization to an outward focus on sensing what is needed 
and responding quickly in a unpredictable environment [54]. Sense and Respond 
Logistics is a transformational network-centric concept that enables Joint effects-
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based operations and provides precise, agile support.  Sense and Respond Logistics 
relies upon highly adaptive, self-synchronizing, and dynamic physical and functional 
processes.  It predicts, anticipates, and coordinates actions that provide competitive 
advantage spanning the full range of military operations across the strategic, 
operational, and tactical levels of war.  Sense and Respond Logistics promotes 
doctrinal and organizational transformation, and supports scalable coherence of 
command and control, operations, logistics, intelligence, surveillance, and 
reconnaissance. Some of the key ideas of Sense and Respond, which can be found in 
science and business literature and practice, reflect the application of network-centric 
theory and principles: 
 Demand is ultimately unpredictable, so success depends on speed of 
pattern recognition and speed of response. 
 The best supply chain is no longer highly optimized; it is highly flexible, 
and is considerably more networked and less linear. 
 Organization of business units and subunits into modular dynamically 
reorganizable capabilities that negotiate with one another over 
commitments, and that have adaptable control via brokers, negotiators, 
and arbitrators, replaces fixed organizational structures. 
 Networks self-synchronize via a common environment and set of shared 
objectives; typically commander‟s intent and mission/task/effect 
achievement measures, focusing on operational effectiveness. 
 Adaptable enterprises depend on sophisticated information technology 
support to enable data sharing, knowing earlier, commitment tracking, 
predictions, adaptation, cognitive decision support, and role 
reconfiguration. 
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Figure 3.1.  End-to-End Sense and Respond, from Point-of-Effect   
                         Source of Support 
 
Figure 3.1 depicts the concept of an S&RL capability that operates end-to-end, from 
point-of-effect through source-of-support.  The point-of-effect (denoted by stars in 
the Joint Operations Area [JOA]) is where the demand process starts (it does not start 
at the platform).  The point-of-effect is where the pure demand process starts and 
where the ultimate customer is the enemy/enemy‟s behavior that we are trying to 
change by creating an effect (which may not be kinetic or may not even be military, 
and may be implemented through another national asset).  If the enemy is the 
ultimate customer in this model (or the customer‟s customer in SCOR terminology), 
the customer to the support network is the operational commander and the 
commander‟s intent.  Effects are generated by capability packages, which, in turn, 
are composed of entities that create resource demands.  The points-of-effect, the 
capability packages, and the resource consumption/demand nodes together represent 
the demand network. 
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The area between the points-of-effect and the resource demand signals (in Figure 2.2, 
the area between the stars and the D-nodes) is the Logistics No-Man’s Land and is 
the least understood, but highest potential payoff area for understanding and linking 
effects-based operations and logistics.  Part of the challenge of building the S&RL 
system is traversing this area and linking effects and resource demands directly. The 
support network comprises all nodes involved in responding to needs.  It includes not 
only traditional supply chain nodes, but also any node or potential node capable of 
satisfying that need.  In this definition of the support network, even demand nodes 
under certain conditions become potential sources of support, as do commandeered 
assets, coalition assets, etc.  There are different kinds of support networks that must 
be accommodated.  These include commodities, services, maintenance, and 
manufacturing.  Implied but not shown in Figure 3.1, the support network includes 
distribution services, including transportation services. 
 
The S&R C2 hub is the virtual cross-roads (the technical and system architectures 
would ensure that this hub is not a single-point-of-failure vulnerability in the 
infostructure supporting S&RL) where standards-based transactional information 
would flow through in real-time to send filtered demand signals back to the support 
networks and send status and constraint information from the support network to the 
demand network.  Lessons learned and experience feedback loops would assist in 
adaptation of logistics support strategies over time to meet evolving commander‟s 
intent. The S&R C2 hub is a part of an enterprise-wide Joint Dynamic Adaptive 
Command and Control System (DAC2) that embodies NCW principles, synchronizes 
Ops, ISR, and Log, and supports planning and execution of Joint Adaptive 
Expeditionary Warfare.  Real-time information flows will link global support 
networks with total asset and process visibility and global anticipatory demand 
networks to support effects-based operations and provide a constantly adapting 
enterprise capability. 
 
Focused logistics have 7 future logistics capabilities by DoD: All capabilities are 
intended to support an overall joint logistics capability which DoD defines as „the 
capability to build effective, responsive, and efficient capacity into the deployment 
and sustainment pipeline; exercise control over the pipeline from end to end; and 
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provide certainty to the supported joint force commander that forces, equipment, 
sustainment and support will arrive where needed on time‟ [55]:  
 Joint theater logistics : Important areas for joint theater logistics [55]:  
 Receiving and processing a large influx of supplies at the beginning of 
a military operation. In order to achieve, command and control should 
be plained.   
 Management of supplies moving across the distribution system, to 
achieve it should be developed an information technology system and 
container management procedures.  
 Theater wide coordination of surface transportation assets. To do so, 
information technology should be used, skilled personnel number 
should increase and the command structure should be made clear. 
 Consolidation of supply storage and shipping activities 
 Joint deployment\ rapid distribution  
 Agile sustainment 
 operational engineering 
 Force health protection  
 Multinational logistics 
 Logistics information fusion  
3.1. Acquisition 
The department responsible from acquisition has three aims [7]:  
 Creating an efficient logistical systems that provided sufficient quantities of 
supplies in a timely manner 
 Assisting movement of supplies to the field forces  
 Maintaining strict accountability for money and supplies  
In order to have products in desired quantity and quality in minimum cost at the right 
time, acquisition strategies should be developed:  
F1: Acquisition design 
D1: Strategy development  
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By acquisition, it is desired to have needed- featured new product in minimum cost at 
the right time. Strategies are decreasing cost elements, knowledge of contemporary 
products and right time to order. Axiomatic design equation is given by Equation 3.1.  
 
F1: Acquisition design D1: Strategy development  
F11: decrease total cost  
F12: have products in desired features  
F13: have product in right time 
D11: reduced total cost elements 
D12: contemporary knowledge of  
        products 
D13: ordering time  
 
 
                                                                                   (3.1) 
 
Cost includes fixed costs, variable costs and shipping& storage costs. Decrease in 
variable cost can be achieved by decreasing essential needs, decreasing buying, and 
buying products with a reasonable price. Decrease in buying depends on knowledge 
about the quantity of the inventory and usage inventory in all quality aspects.   
Strategies to decrease cost are consolidation, outsourcing and demand decrease.   
1. Consolidation: Logistics economies are achieved through the consolidation of 
customers‟ shipments or suppliers (in a single pick up) [53]. DoD currently 
uses multiple storage and shipping sites within a theater to supply items to its 
customers. In some cases these sites may carry the same supply items and 
ship to same customers. Operating multiple sites requires additional facilities, 
personnel, contract services and inventories and also result in extra movement 
of stock, inefficient use of surface and air distribution assets, increased 
opportunities for information processing errors, and the loss of asset 
visibility. Consolidating storage and shipping arrangements can help address 
these supply chain problems while at the same time reducing DoDs logistics 
footprint. So what should do for consolidation? [55]: First initiative is to 
develop a small-scale, rapidly deployable distribution center that has the 
capability to provide consolidated shipping, receiving, cross-docking, storage, 
communication and order processing. The initiative is aimed at improving the 
flow of logistics information along the supply chain and also providing 
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efficient physical management of material in the theater. Volume 
consolidation can be made in order to decrease the number of suppliers [58]. 
A second consolidation initiative is Joint Regional Inventory and Material 
Management, which is aimed at streamlining the storage and distribution of 
common items for multiple military service locations in a region from a DLA 
hub. The objectives of Joint Regional Inventory and Material Management 
include eliminating duplicate materiel handling and inventory layers.  Third 
initiative is in order to improve the overall efficiency and interoperability of 
material consolidation and shipping activities. [55]. 
2. Outsourcing: DOD uses a combination of in-house military and civilian 
employees and contractors to provide the support operations that are required 
to keep military airplanes, ships, and ground vehicles operational for 
peacetime training and operations and ready to support contingency 
operations whenever or wherever they occur [59, 60, 61, 62]. 
 Private sector applications recommended by GAO are given by Table 3.1 [5, 63, 
64]:  
 
Table 3.1: Private sector applications recommended by GAO.  
Concept Description  
Prime Vendor A prime vendor buys inventory from a variety of suppliers, stores 
the inventory in its own warehouse, and delivers inventory to the 
customer within hours of receiving the order [64].  
 
Integrated 
Supplier 
An integrated supplier assumes almost total inventory 
management responsibilities for a customer. This is the most 
aggressive form of a supplier partnership where a supplier 
representative works in the customer‟s facility, ordering supplies 
as they are needed, and replenishing storage locations. Inventory 
is stored by the supplier in the supplier‟s warehouse until ordered 
and then delivered on a just-in-time basis. An integrated supplier 
can also perform quality inspections, maintain data on usage, test 
the quality of parts, prepare parts kits, establish electronic data 
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interchange links and barcoding, and provide vendor selection 
management.  
 
Local 
Distribution  
Centers/ 
Supplier Parks 
One or more suppliers locate a distribution center within close 
proximity to their customers. From this location, the supplier 
delivers items to the customer within 24 hours or less of receiving 
an order. The supplier is linked electronically with the customer. 
In some cases the supplier can perform the receiving function for 
the customer in the local distribution center before inventory 
leaves the facility. 
 
 
DOD has successfully used prime vendor arrangements for some consumable items 
such as foods and medical supplies [59]. The prime vendor program uses a 
contractual arrangement with one or more commercial vendors to supply a wide 
range of commercial off-the-shelf material directly to military customers on a just-in-
time basis [65, 66]. Under the prime vendor concept, DOD relies on a distributor of a 
commercial product line, who provides that product line and incidental services to 
customers in an assigned region or area of responsibility. Products or services are to 
be delivered within a specified period of time after order placement. Logistics 
support arrangements include [67]:  
 contractor logistics support, where the contractor provided most or all 
elements of logistics support, including depot maintenance;   
 total system performance responsibility, under which the contractor assumed 
responsibility for the weapon system‟s life-cycle management;  
 total system sustainment responsibility or total system support responsibility, 
which gave the contractor responsibility for all contracted sustainment actions 
including parts management and depot level repair. 
 
The Walter Reed Army Medical Center started stocking their pharmacies through the 
Prime Vendor Program 3 years ago. Since then they have reduced warehouse space 
from seven to half of one, eliminated 32 staff positions saved $400000 [68]. Under 
the medical prime vendor program, % 98 of orders are delivered within 24 hours, 
compared to previous time of 30 days-while at the same time prices are generally 
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35% less than before; and inventory reductions of more than 29% [68].  Under the 
Industrial Prime Vendor initiative, the vendor is contractually required to meet %100 
of customer needs and deliver items.  
 
The benefits of prime vendor contracts include [69]:  
 improved access to a wide range of high-quality commercial products,  
 rapid and predictable delivery from a single vendor at the time and in the 
manner most conducive to the customer‟s needs, and reduced overhead 
charges 
 significant reductions in the manpower needed to manage these items at 
DLA,  
 elimination of any DLA inventory investment, reduction of the infrastructure 
and related costs associated with warehousing that inventory, 
 reduced transportation costs via multiple-item prime vendor deliveries to the 
customer rather than transportation from vendors to the military depots for 
subsequent transportation to the ultimate customer.  
 provide for surge and broader mobilization capabilities,  
 worldwide customer support. 
DOD spends $10billion annually on multiyear procurement (MYP) contracts for 
weapon systems. MYPS may save money through more efficient relations with 
suppliers and producers but may also suffer losses if canceled and can limit future 
budget flexibility [70]. MYP are expected to achieve lover unit costs through the 
following sources:  
 Purchase of parts and materials in economic order quantities 
 Improved production processes and efficiencies  
 Better utilized industrial facilities 
 Limited engineering changes due to the design stability during MY period 
 Cost avoidance by reducing the burden of placing and administrating annual 
contracts  
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Equation 3.2 is given for axiomatic design of F11: decreasing total cost.  
F111: variable product costs 
F112: decrease fixed costs 
F113: decrease shipping& storage costs  
 
D111: reduced demand  
D112: consolidation  
D113: outsourcing 
 
 
                                                                               (3.2) 
 
Decrease in variable costs depends on decrease in the quantity of demand. 
Decreasing logistics demand is a major element of cutting costs and improving 
flexibility. Reducing demand requires concerted emphasis on [71, 72]: 
 Reducing legacy systems‟ maintenance requirements 
 Reducing the consumption of consumables 
 Designing new systems to be more reliable and require fewer people to 
operate and maintain 
 Redesigning of combat and support organizations and their equipment to 
reduce their size, weight and consumption rates 
 Adopting management techniques that reduce system/ equipment 
maintenance demands and supply consumption.  
Another factor decreases variable cost is unit price. Procurement should be made by 
best value concept. Best value procurements are those that in the federal 
government‟s view provide the greatest overall benefits, not just the price [73]. In 
order to improve management of spare part prices these steps can be taken [74]:  
 Detailed analysis of price increases 
 Management reviews to address the risk of overpricing 
 Information technology initiatives at helping DLA buyers determine price 
reasonableness and better alerting customer to possible price increases. 
Shopping should be mad via e-commerce channels. DLA‟s electronic mall 
enables customers to shop via the internet and because electronic catalogs, 
compare prices, and order items from pre-established contracts via computers 
[75].  
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Equation 3.3 is given for axiomatic design of F111: decrease in. variable product cost. 
Equation 3.4 is given for F1133: decrease new acquisition which is another functional 
requirement to decrease in variable product cost. Equation 3.5. 
 
 
F1131: buy product with a reasonable   
               price  
F1132: decrease in shipping in theatre 
F1133: decrease new acquisition  
         F11331: exact usage of inventory in   
                     depots by quantity and  
                     quality  
               F113311:exact usage in quantity  
               F113312: exact usage in quality  
         F11332: decrease in logistics  
                     demand seems necessary  
 
 
D1131: price analysis  
D1132: order in economic quantity  
D1133: demand analysis 
D11331: inventory management 
              D113311:inventory visibility 
              D113312:maintenance procedure  
         
D11332: minimized demand by redesigning  
           Forces 
 
 
                                                                          (3.3) 
 
                                                                             (3.4) 
 
                                                                         (3.5) 
 
 
For security, in procurement not only cost is important but also desired-features of 
the product is important. Desired features means quantity and the quality of the 
product are in enough level. Axiomatic design equation for desired product features 
is given by Equation 3.6. 
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F121: buy desired-quality product  
F122: buy desired-quantity product  
   
D121: quality standard development update 
D122: filing product data  
  
 
                                                                                      (3.6) 
 
Demand quantity depends on safety stock in peace time and probability of war. 
Demand quantity for probability of war depends on what enemy has in quantity and 
quality, and in required time to rebound from the war to fight again. Product quality 
is not robustness but also dependent on enemy‟s product quality. In order to order 
product having desired features, it is required to have up-to-date product information. 
The currency of product information includes  product data folder currency and 
quality standard currency. During filing product data, inventory visibility and 
forecasting is important. Simulation techniques should be used in forecasting. 
 
DOD forecasts operational requirements for spare and repair parts differently than it 
does for items that result from rapidly emerging needs. DOD forecasting methods for 
spare and repair parts vary by service. The Army normally uses a computer model to 
forecast its spare and repair parts requirements based on the average monthly 
demand over the previous 24 months. The model uses DOD planning guidance and 
Army information on anticipated force structure including a list of the end items and 
associated spare parts. For each end item or part, the model uses data on expected 
usage and spare-parts consumption rates based on breakage, geography, 
environment, and rates of equipment loss due to battle damage. [56]. The Marine 
Corps also uses models and involves operational and logistics planners at several 
levels of command to validate their forecasted requirements. Operational 
requirements to support rapidly emerging needs, such as Interceptor body armor and 
up-armored High-Mobility Multi-Purpose Wheeled Vehicle (HMMWV), are 
developed outside of normal supply forecasting procedures. They are identified 
through operational needs statements from the theater that are validated and 
resourced by the Army. Units in theater submit operational needs statements for the 
items, which are combined by their higher headquarters into theater requirements. 
The Coalition Forces Land Component Command communicates these requirements 
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to the Department of the Army, where they are validated and resourced by offices of 
the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Financial Management and Comptroller), the 
Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations, the Deputy Chief of Staff for Program and 
Analysis, and the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics and eventually transmitted to 
the program manager [56]. To improve the forecast , data about operations plan 
should be obtained accuretly [56].  
 
To determine the number and the type of munitions(muhimmat) needed, the services 
annually evaluate their munition requirements using a multiphase analytical precess. 
The phases of the process[76]: 
 Identify targets by phases of the war 
 Develop combat requirements using battle simulation models and scenerios 
 Training of the forces by munitions 
 Providing Post-major theater of war combat capability  
 Peacetime requirements  
 Munitions effectiveness data  
The accuracy of the process is critical as its outcomes defines the number and types 
of munitions necessary to defeat potential threats; affects munitions planning, 
programming and budgeting decisions; and influences industrial production base 
decisions [76]. But the munition requirement determination process should be 
improved like [76]:  
 Coordinating the threat assessment 
 Updating projections about the amount of time it would take a potential 
enemy to repair and return damaged targets to the battlefield and damage 
assessments for input into the services‟ battle simulation models  
 Modifying the target allocation process 
 Making a more comprehensive risk assessment  
 
Equation 3.7 is given for axiomatic design of F122: buy desired-quantity product. 
Equation 3.8 is given for sub-functional requirements of F1221: know required 
inventory for probability of war.   
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F1221: know required inventory for  probability  
           of war   
        F12211: inventory belonging to enemy  
        F12212: time to rebound from the war 
F1222: know required inventory for peacetime  
         (safety stocks, training stocks) 
D1221: forecasting 
                 D12211: spying  
                 D12212:  simulation 
D1222: inventory visibility 
 
 
                                                                                  (3.7) 
 
                                                                              (3.8) 
 
Another concern in acquisition is right-time delivery. For cost side, products should 
be delivered quickly. Management of inventory acquisition lead times is important in 
maintaining cost-effective inventories, budgeting, and having material available 
when needed, as lead times are DOD‟s best estimate of when an item will be 
received. Acquisition lead time, also known as procurement lead time,
 
measures the 
length of time between the initiation of a procurement action and the receipt of items 
into the supply system.  
Acquisition lead time consists of two parts [77]:  
 Administrative lead time is the time interval from the initiation of a 
procurement action to the contract award 
 production lead times is the interval from the contract award to delivery of the 
items.  
Reducing acquisition lead times decreases inventory levels and associated inventory 
holding costs.   
 
In order to get orders on time, they should be given in time. By contract management 
and information technologies and outsourcing, lead time can be decreased. To give 
order on time, an automation system that alerts customer can be used to ensure asset 
visibility for re-order point. Depending on the item, the reorder point may include 
requirements for one or more of the following [78]:  
 war reserves that are authorized to be purchased, 
 customer-requisitioned material that has not been shipped, 
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 a safety level to be on hand in case of minor interruptions in the resupply 
process or unpredictable fluctuations in demand, 
 stock to satisfy demands during the period between when a need to buy an 
item is identified and when it is received, 
 minimum quantities for designated items (insurance items), and 
 stock to satisfy demands during the repair period for repairable items 
Generally, inventory managers order an amount of inventory called an economic 
order quantity, which is the quantity of inventory that will result in the lowest total 
costs for ordering and holding inventory.  
Axiomatic design equation for F13 is given by Equation 3.9. Equation 3.10 is given 
for sub-functional requirements of F132 lead time.   
  
F131: time of giving order  
F132: lead time 
       F1321: production lead time  
       F1322: administrative lead time 
 
D131: re-order point design 
D132: lead time strategies  
        D1321: outsourcing  
        D1322: contract management tools 
 
 
                                                                                      (3.9) 
 
                                                                                (3.10) 
 
Figure 3.2 is the design mapping for axiomatic design of acquisition design.
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Figure 3.2 Design mapping for acquisition
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3.2. Storage 
 
The war reserves are indented to fill the gap until the national supply system can 
increase production [56]. They consist of major items including trucks and secondary 
items such as spare parts, food, clothing, medical supplies, and fuel. When the total 
of on-hand and due-in inventory falls to or below a certain level-called reorder point- 
inventory managers place orders for additional inventory [78].  At first DLA was 
buying consumable items in large quantities, states them in distribution depots until 
they are requested by military services, and then shipped them to a service facility 
where they are used [79]. But now it is different. Now it is outsourced for just-in-
time or prepositioned.  
 
Managing inventory is one of the key features of logistics. Inventory management 
includes minimization of costs and maximization of usage of inventory. Profit 
maximization and risk minimization strategies should be developed to better 
management. Equation 3.11 is given to show the axiomatic relation.  
 
F2: Satisfy customers D2: Inventory strategy  
 
F21: decrease costs 
F22: increase inventory usage 
 
D21: increased profit 
D22: reduced inventory risks 
 
 
                                                                                         (3.11) 
 
In order to minimize costs, fixed costs including fixed assets and administration& 
selling costs should be decreased; inventory levels and movement of inventory in 
depots should be minimized by  eliminating nonvalue added functions as much as 
possible, inventory accuract and developing inventory allocation strategy. 
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Equation 3.12 is given for axiomatic design of F21:decrease cost.  
 
F211: decrease fixed costs   
F212: decrease inventory level  
F213: decrease movement of equipment in   
         Depot 
D211: elimination  as much as possible  
D212: inventory accuracy 
D213: inventory allocation strategy  
 
 
                                                                             (3.12) 
 
Decrease in fixed costs can be achieved by eliminating as much as possible via 
outsourcing and selecting assets based on long term strategy which is given by 
Equation 3.13.   
 
F211: decrease fixed costs   
        F2111: decrease administration and   
                  selling  costs 
        F2112: decrease fixed assets  
D211: elimination  as much as possible  
        D2111: outsourcing 
        D2112: asset selection (tangible or   
                   intangible) based on long   
                   term strategy 
 
 
                                                                                (3.13) 
 
The objective in inventory strategy is to achieve desired customer service with min 
inventory level [58]. GAO identified dods supply chain management as a high risk 
area because of high inventory levels [56]. Inventory level minimization means 
minimization in depot inventory, minimization of non-stable inventory (under 
maintenance [80] and in-transit), clarification of pre-positioned equipment quantity 
and minimization of in-theater inventory.  
 
For strategic mobility framework, some equipment should be prepositioned. Instead 
of long movement of needed equipment, by prepositioning it allows combat-ready 
forces [81, 82, 83]. Each military services prepositions combat and support 
equipment and supplies in order to speed response times of US forces to operating 
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locations and reduce the strain on  scarce airlift or slower sealift assets [54].  Army, 
navy and air force prepositioned equipment list  is given by Table 3.2 [81, 83, 84]: 
 
Table 3.2: Prepositioned equipment list of Army, Navy and Air Force. 
Service Types of 
stocks 
Description 
 
Army 
 
Combat 
brigade sets 
 are designed to support 3000-5000 force 
 Include support equipment such as trucks 
and high mobility multipurpose wheeled 
vehicles  
 Include spare parts and other sustainment 
stocks to support the early stage of a 
conflict 
 Include heavy weaponry such as tanks and 
brodley fighting vehicles 
 
 Sustainment 
stocks 
 Items to sustain the battle unit until 
resupply can be ramped up to wartime 
levels and arrive in theater 
 War reserve secondary items include 
clothing, textiles, construction and barrier 
material, medical supplies, repair parts and 
major assemblies (reparables and 
consumables)  
 
 Operational 
project stocks 
 Authorized material above unit 
authorizations designed to support Army 
operations  
 Equipment and supplies for special 
operation forces, bare base sets, petroleum 
and water distribution, mortuary operation 
and prisoner-of-war operations ( Bare base 
set: tents for troops, latrines, kitchens, 
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airlift hangers, maintenance shops, 
generators, and environmental controls. 
The sets support early arriving combat 
forces and are especially critical in austere 
environment [83])  
 
Navy/Marine 
Corps 
 
Maritime 
prepositioning 
force  
 Consists of 16 prepositioninig ships 
organized into three squadrons (Planners 
have created mobile forward supply 
depots. Material has been placed on 
squadrons of large ships, which are rotated 
near potential hotspots. The ships are 
designed to rapidly unload equipment and 
supplies and then exit the combat area. To 
maintain the resupply effort, the concept of 
logistics over horizon is developed which 
allows ships to offload miles from shore on 
floating causeways. In regions without 
seaport, the resupply is conducted via air 
[85].) 
 Each squadron supports about 15000 
marines for up to 30 days 
 Includes combat systems, communications 
systems, construction equipment, 
munitions, medical supplies, and 
sustainment stocks  
 
 Prepositioning 
program-
Norway 
 
 Several land sites located in central 
Norway 
 Designed to support 13000 marines for up 
to 30 days 
 Includes vehicles, weapons, munitions, 
rations, and other equipment that will be 
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used to support any geographic combatant 
command 
 
 
 Navy 
prepositioned 
assets 
 
 Assets are stored aboard maritime 
prepositioning ships and at land sites 
 Equipment to offload prepositioned ships, 
including material handling equipment, 
ramps and barges, landing and amphibious 
craft, and bulk fuel 
 Construction equipment such as cranes, 
forklifts, trucks, and tractor trailers 
 Includes six 500-bed fleet hospitals 
 
Air Force Bare base sets  
 
 Base operating support equipment used to 
house forces, and equipmement and 
supplies needed to support airfield 
operations 
 
 Vehicles 
 
 Includes trucks, buses, and High mobility 
multipurpose wheeled vehicles 
 
 Other support 
equipment 
and supplies 
 
 Includes material handling equipment, 
rotations, fuel, fuel support equipment, 
aircraft accessories, and medical supplies 
at land sites and munitions aboard four 
prepositioning ships 
 
 
The other concern about prepositioning is to decide what to store, how many and 
where. It should be compared the risk of insufficient inventory to gained 
profitability. Experiences in Iraq showed that prepositioned secondary item stocks 
did not adequately support the troops in combat operations. Lessons learned also 
46 
 
show considerable mismatches between what was available and what units actually 
needed. In retro respect Army did a poor job in forecasting [81].  Where to position 
equipment is another concern. They should be positioned to the area which conflicts 
can arise. As seen below, Army prepositioned military equipment on ships afloat 
near Guam and Diego Garcia and overseas on land Europe, Northeast Asia, 
Southwest Asia [81] which can be positioned against Middle East, Russia and China.  
 
 
Figure 3.3 Location of Army, Navy and Air Force prepositioned stock 
 
Army has developed a pool of equipment in theater to expedite the replacement of 
equipment damaged during operations referred as TSS theater sustainment stocks 
which includes tanks , or support vehicles. On the other hand TPE (theater provided 
equipment) is developed in order to ensure that deployed units receive required 
amount of equipment critical for their missions, like MMWV or communication 
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device. TPE is known as stay-behind-equipment. The disadvantage of TPE is that 
they are only fixed at unit level. Keeping large amount of stocks in theater for long 
periods of time without the opportunity of depot level maintenance has created a 
number of consequences:  like training of unit level personnel, high fixing costs [24].  
To minimize inventory level, inventory accuracy should be provided via minimizing 
lead time, outsourcing, developing forecasting strategies and maintenance 
procedures. The relationship is given by Equation 3.14.  
 
F2121: clarify pre-positioned equipment feature  
 F2122:reduce in-theater inventory  
F2123: reduce in-depot inventory  
F2124: reduce non-stable inventory  
         
 
 D2121: forecasting strategies  
D2122: decreased lead time  
D2123: outsource ( integrated   
           supplier, vendor)  
D2124: maintenance procedure  
 
 
                                                                             (3.14) 
 
Another cost factor in inventory management beside inventory level and fixed cost is 
inventory movement in depots. Movement on depot for distribution and for finding 
location should be minimized. Inventory allocation strategies should be developed 
based on turn out rate of equipment, volume, weight, and critical features like 
flammability. Tagging technologies can be used. Before Iraqu War, DOD integrated 
supply chain by using softwares, barcodes and RFID [5].  Instead of passive RFID 
systems active ones are preffered [55, 86]. Before the war, return and reuse of active 
RFID tags was 10% but during war decreased to %3. And only % 16 was used more 
than twice. Active RFID tags have transmitters that transmit information through 
radis signals. They hold large amount of data so they are capable of storing detailed 
manifest and transportation data [86]. The next generation Mobile Tracking System 
is a satellite tracking system for trucks that in its most advanced configuration is also 
able to read and relay information from radio frequency identification tags attached 
to containers and pallets traveling in a supply convoy. This technology could provide 
near real-time visibility and location data on supplies moving through the theater by 
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surface transportation. However, the technology is expensive and few trucks are 
equipped with this latest configuration.  
 
In order to decrease movement of equipment, sub-functional requirements, their 
design parameters and relation is given by Equation 3.15. 
 
     F2131: decrease transportation in depot  
      F2132: decrease movement to find  
       
     D2131: inventory allocation procedures 
      D2132: tagging strategy for visibility 
 
 
                                                                                (3.15) 
 
Another way to increase profit via customer satisfaction is maximization of inventory 
usage. In order to use inventory in high percents, security should be provided, 
inventory should be stored in sufficient quantity and quality depots in order to be in 
good-condition, and equipment reset strategies should be developed to have 
currently-usable inventory. DOD has a $60 billion inventory of which General 
Accounting Office found 50 % to be obsolete [5]. 
 
The armys lack of adequate storage facilities for prepositioned equipment has led to 
equipment being stored outdoor, leaving it relatively unprotected from moisture, 
sand, and other elements and thus contributing to a number of maintenance problems 
including corrosion. For example if tanks are stored outside, preventive maintenance 
inspections should be performed every 30 days. If they are stored in controlled 
humidity warehouses, inspections are only performed every 6 months [81]. So 
maintenance strategy and procedures should be developed. Requirements are defined 
invalid and poorly resulting unreliable reporting of readiness of prepositioned 
equipment sets. On the other hand, by asset visibility it should be ensured what is 
stored and what is currently usable. Recapitalization of equipment via army reset 
program can help inventory currency.  
In order to increase inventory usage, functional reqirements and their design 
parameters relation is given by Equation 3.16. 
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F221: secure  inventory  
F222: update currently-usable inventory  
F223:keep inventory in-good condition  
 
D221: protection measures 
D222: equipment reset procedures  
D223: depot features 
 
 
                                                                             (3.16) 
 
DOD invests billions of dollars on sophisticated weapon systems and technologies. 
These may be at risk of exploitation when exported, stolen or lost during combat or 
routine missions. In order to decrease risk anti-tamper policy is developed for critical 
technologies. Anti-tamper techniques include software and hardware protective 
devices, when technologies are determined to be critical and vulnerable. To protect 
its critical assets, DOD established several protection measures [87]:  
i) Information assurance to protect information and information systems 
ii) Software protection to prevent the unauthorized distribution and 
exploitation of critical software 
iii) Anti-tamper tech. to help delay exploitation of technologies through 
means such as reverse engineering when US weapons are exported or lost 
in battle field  
In order to secure inventory, functional requirements and their design parameters 
relation is given by Equation 3.17.  
F2211: security of tangible inventory (weapon) 
F2212: security of software 
  
       D2211: anti-damper laws 
       D2212: software security tools  
  
 
                                                                                (3.17) 
 
 
Design map for axiomatic design of „Storage management‟ is given by Figure 3.4.
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Figure 3.4 Design mapping for storage management
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3.3. Distribution  
According to DoD distribution is the operational process of synchronizing all 
elements of the logistics system to deliver right items to right place [56]. In wars, 
order-to-receipt time is one of the success criteria. In 2003 Iraq war, US troops upset 
the Saddam government in just half time of settling in 1991 Desert Storm [5].   
The military distribution system has two distinct segments: strategic-national and 
theater. The strategic-national segment consists of moving supplies from points 
outside a theater of military operations into the theater. The military services and the 
Defense Logistics Agency manage supplies and provide for asset visibility. U.S. 
Transportation Command provides transportation support, primarily strategic airlift 
and sealift, as well as intransit asset visibility. The theater segment consists of 
distribution that occurs within a theater of military operations. Theater distribution is 
the responsibility of the geographic combatant command, such as U.S. Central 
Command. The combatant commander will generally designate one military service 
to act as the theater lead service to oversee logistics support to all of the service 
components and to the theater [52]. During Operation Iraqi, the Army and Marine 
Corps experienced problems with delivery of supplies to warfighter. To solve the 
problem they identified „joint theater logistics‟ [55]. Joint theater logistics is aimed at 
improving the ability of a joint force commander to a direct various logistics 
functions which is shown by Figure 3. 5 [55, 88].  
 
Figure 3.5. Joint Distribution System 
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In order to have a customer- satisfied distribution system transportation performance 
should be increased whereas risk of failure should be decreased. A company's 
distribution network design is the number and type of customer interfaces. That is, 
designing order entry points (where and how orders are placed) and fulfillment nodes 
(where and how customers obtain finished goods). Th aximatic relation is given by 
Equation 3.18.  
 
F3: customer- satisfied distribution system D3: distribution network design 
 
F31: increase transportation performance 
F32: reduce risk of failure  
D31: transportation optimization 
D32: increased consistency        
        
  
                                                                                                     (3.18) 
 
Performance indicators for transportation are throughput maximization, time definite 
delivery, cost minimization and flexibility. Throughput maximization is reduction the 
number of times that supplies must be opened and sorted, for example because of 
pure packaging [55]. Fundamental economic principles impacting transportation 
economy are economy of scale and economy of distance. Transportation costs are 
driven by distance, volume, density, stowability -how product case dimensions fit 
into transportation equipment-, handling, and liability -product characteristic to 
damage- [58].  
 
By flexibility, it is aimed to define a transportation mode having high 
maneuverability, large freight volume, can be used in all weather and climatic 
condition.   
 
Transportation optimization methods are consolidation, outsourcing, route 
optimization and selecting right transportation mode based on product features, 
quantity and critique. Equipment and supplies are delivered in three ways: by air, by 
sea or by prepositioning [81]. Because of it is anywhere that conflict starts, and 
because of high cost and time consuming, land is not preferred. While airlift is fast it 
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is expensive to use and impractical for moving all of the material needed for a large 
scale deployment. Although ships can carry loads, they are slower than airlift. For 
speed up and minimization of risk, ships are designed smaller [23]. Transportation 
vehicle should have capability of high speed, long distance, high maneuverability, 
and large freight volume [22].   
By consolidating of procurement and consolidating of shipping can minimize cost 
and increase efficiency of distribution. Especially for their intermediaries, third party 
logistics is preferred. Another outsourcing method that can be used for having 
procurement as quickly as possible is supplier integration. An integrated supplier 
assumes almost total inventory management responsibilities for a customer. This is 
the most aggressive form of a supplier partnership where a supplier representative 
works in the customer‟s facility, ordering supplies as they are needed, and 
replenishing storage locations. Inventory is stored by the supplier in the supplier‟s 
warehouse until ordered and then delivered on a just-in-time basis. An integrated 
supplier can also perform quality inspections, maintain data on usage, test the quality 
of parts, prepare parts kits, establish electronic data interchange links and barcoding, 
and provide vendor selection management  which is shown in Figure 3. 6 [79].  
 
 
Figure 3.6 Integrated supplier 
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In order to increase transportation performance, sub-functional requirements and 
their design parameters relation is given by Equation 3.19. Equation 3.20 is given for 
axiomatic relation of functional requirement of increasing efficiency of distribution. 
 
F311: increase efficiency of distribution 
     F3111: flexibility  
     F3112: achieve time definite delivery 
F312: increase throughput 
F313:decrease cost 
 
D311: routing management 
D3111:transportation mode selection  
D3112: route optimization 
D312:consolidation 
D313:outsoursing 
 
 
                                                                             (3.19)  
 
                                                                                (3.20) 
In order to minimize risk of failure, continuous flow of resources should be 
maintained, shipping priorities should be managed and accuracy of inventory should 
be provided.  In order to maintain continuous, seamless, two-way flow of resources, 
the distribution channel principles should be integrated. Each layer of marketing 
intermediaries that performs some work in bringing the product to its final buyer is a 
"channel level". Cross-docking, transshipment and direct shipment are some of the 
strategies to increase distribution efficiencies. Cross-docking involves central 
warehousing, which do not stock inventory but serve as transshipment locations for 
outside vendors connecting to the organization. Direct shipment from manufacturer 
to customer reduces the need for intermediate transit or warehouse points [5]. 
Advantages of direct shipment are reduction in lead times and reduction in the 
expenses because of not operating a distribution center [90]. Disadvantages are risk-
pooling effects and costs increase because it must send smaller trucks to more 
locations. Another concern in flow of resources is having a safety stock in theater. 
The safety stock should be minimized in order to reduce reliance on large, costly 
stockpiles.  
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Another important point in risk minimization and increase consistency is to decide 
shipping priorities: which one, in which order, what quantity, in which conditions, 
what frequency, etc [90]. To solve the problem shipping procedures should be 
developed based on defined criteria.   
In order to have inventory accuracy, the quantity and the quality of the inventory –in 
transit or in warehouses- should be known, and logistician should be connected. To 
connect logisticians Army stated that it would acquire systems [52]: 
 The very small aperture terminal: a compact satellite to replace line-of-sight 
communications to send and monitor requisitions for supplies from the 
battlefield 
 Mobile tracking systems: a satellite based  way text messaging system 
installed in trucks to provide position locations and allow truck drivers to 
communicate with a dispatcher  
. Systems developed for distribution visibility are:  
 Battle Command Sustainment Support System processes a large amount of 
logistics data and can facilitate decision making by providing a means for 
commanders to determine the sustainability of current and planned 
operations. The system provides a capability for tracking supply convoys 
moving through an area of operation. However, it lacks the integration to 
produce and send a cargo manifest that can be linked to an in-transit visibility 
device for tracking.  
 TransLog Web was designed to serve as the single point of entry for 
transportation movement requests. This Web-based program could serve as a 
transportation planning and movement tracking tool to assist movement 
managers in coordinating supplies and transportation assets. However, the 
system (1) is not used by all movement control teams, (2) does not provide 
visibility of the cargo‟s description beyond the supply class, and (3) does not 
feed information to the Global Transportation Network. 
 Transportation Coordinator‟s Automated Information for Movements System 
II is expected to enhance and improve the efficiency and effectiveness of 
support planning needed to deploy and redeploy forces and equipment; 
improve the visibility of assets; and enhance cargo and passenger receiving, 
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controlling, and shipping. However, the system is not scheduled to be fully 
operational until around 2010, and while the Army justified the system based 
on its joint service application, two services (the Air Force and the Marine 
Corps) have stated that they do not intend to use it. 
In order to reduce risk of failure, axiomatic design functional requirements and 
design parameters relation are given by Equation 3.21.  
F321:accuracy of inventory 
F322: managing shipping priorities 
F323: maintain continuous flow of resources 
 
D321: inventory visibility  
D322: criteria development 
D323: distribution channel strategy 
 
 
                                                                             (3.21) 
 
Design map for axiomatic design of „Distribution Management‟ is given by Figure 
3.7. 
 
 
Figure 3.7 Design mapping for distribution management 
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3.4. Maintenance  
 
Harsh combat and environmental conditions in theater over sustain periods 
exacerbates the wear and tear on equipment [91].  Maintenance is an important 
aspect of military logistics and includes those activities needed to keep weapons, 
vehicles, and other materiel in an operable condition; to restore them to a serviceable 
condition when necessary; or to improve their usefulness through modifications. 
Such maintenance activities include inspection, testing, and classification as to 
serviceability, adjustment, servicing, recovery, evacuation, repair, overhaul, and 
modification. Modern military equipment is complex and expensive and must be 
designed with reliability, durability, and ease of maintenance in mind. Thus, 
maintenance requirements, the potential usage of repair parts, and the tools and 
equipment needed to effect repairs are determined during the equipment 
development process, and operational capabilities must sometimes be sacrificed for 
greater reliability or ease of maintenance. Life cycle maintenance costs are also an 
important consideration inasmuch as the lifetime maintenance costs usually exceed 
an item's initial acquisition costs. 
 
The Army calls maintenance as reset as the repair, recapitalization and replacement 
of equipment to equip units preparing for deployment and improve next-to-deploy 
unit‟s equipment on hand levels. Repair can be made at the field level or national 
(depot) level. Field level maintenance is done by soldiers augmented by contractors, 
as required and is usually performed at installations where the equipment is 
stationed. National level maintenance work performed on equipment that exceeds 
field level reset capabilities. Depot maintenance as defined as the material 
maintenance and repair requiring the overhaul, upgrading, or rebuilding of parts, 
assemblies, or subassemblies, and the testing and reclamation of equipment as 
necessary, regardless of the source of funds or the location at which the maintenance 
or repair is performed [92]. National level maintenance may be done at Army depots 
by contractors, by installation activities or as a combination of the two [91]. 
Recapitalization includes rebuilding of equipment which could include: extending 
service life, reducing operating and support costs, enhancing capability and 
improving system reliability. The objective of recapitalization process include 
extending equipment service life, reducing operating and support costs, enhancing 
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capability, improving system reliability and maintainability [93]. Replacement 
includes buying new equipment to replace confirmed battle losses, washouts, 
obsolete equipment and critical equipment deployed and left in theater but needed by 
reserve components for homeland defense and security missions [91, 93].  
In order to have a customer satisfied maintenance function, total cost, risk and 
required time should be decreased. By taking some precautions, customers can be 
satisfied. The relation is given by Equation 3.22. 
 
F4: satisfy customer  D4: strategy development 
F41: reduce total cost 
F42: decrease risk 
F43: decrease time per work 
D41: decreased repairing  
D42: accuracy  
D43: speed up strategies 
 
                                                                                 (3.22) 
 
Cost for repairing are shipping, material and personnel costs. Shipment cost is the 
cost of delivering the product to the repair facility including the packaging and 
shipping cost of both sending the product for repair and returning it alter it is 
repaired.  Personnel cost is the direct and indirect cost of human resources applied to 
a repair job. Material cost is the direct and indirect cost of parts and machinery 
applied to a repair job [94]. Personnel costs include training and labor costs. In order 
to minimize costs there are some strategies like consolidation and outsourcing. 
Directly a firm just responsible for repair and maintenance can be outsourced. At the 
same time especially for weapon systems the firm sold products can be responsible. 
Another method to decrease cost is to take precautions for breakdown like predictive 
and preventive maintenance or resetting the equipment. The relation is given by 
Equation 3.23.  
F411: decrease personnel costs 
F412: material costs  
F413: decrease shipping& storage cos 
 
D411: outsourcing 
D412: taking precautions for breakdown  
          frequency 
D413: consolidation               
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                                                                             (3.23) 
 
 
For military risk is human life. So everything should be made to decrease risk. 
Equipment should be repaired correctively and should not affect army readiness too 
much. If it takes too much time army should use another equipment instead of it [89]. 
So life of the equipment and all of its affect should be forecasted. To be repaired 
correctively equipment should be sent to a maintenance center that satisfies criteria 
for that problem. In order to decrease risk, functional requirements and their relation 
to design parameters is given by Equation 3.24.  
 
F42: decrease risk D42: accuracy  
 
F421: repaire correct way   
F422: decrease affect to army readiness       
D421: maintenance center capability  
         criteria  
D422: time and life forecasting for if new  
          procurement is needed 
               
 
                                                                                   (3.24) 
 
Another important point is minimization of time for maintenance and shipping. By 
choosing faster transportation methods – decreasing distance or speed up- shipping 
time can be reduced. If unit level is enough there is no need to send equipment to 
another center. Maintenance time includes preparation time and core-repair time. To 
decrease time, maintenance procedure should be developed and maintenance center 
should be designed in that way. Procedures should be developed based on the 
environment where the equipment is used. For example for vehicles used in Iraq and 
Afghanistan 3D (delayed desert damage) and STIR (special technical inspection and 
repair) methods are developed [24]. Another important point is repair items in the 
sequence of their critical level [95].   One approach to accelerate the repair process 
and promote flexibility in the repair shop is the “cellular” concept. Under this 
concept, an airline moved all of the resources that are needed to repair broken parts, 
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such as tooling and support equipment, personnel, and inventory, into one location or 
repair center “cell.” This approach simplifies the repair of parts by eliminating the 
time-consuming exercise of routing parts to workshops in different locations. It also 
ensures that mechanics have the technical support to ensure that operations run 
smoothly. In addition, because inventory is placed near workshops, mechanics have 
quick access to the parts they need to complete repairs more quickly. British Airways 
adopted the cellular approach after determining that parts could be repaired as much 
as ten times faster using this concept [96].  
 
In order to decrease time, maintenance time and shipping time should be decreased. 
The axiomatic relation is given by Equation 3.25 and Equation 3.26.  
  
F43: decrease time D43: speed up strategies 
 
F431: decrease maintenance time 
       F4311: decrease core-repair time 
       F4312: decrease preparation time 
F432: decrease shipping time 
D431: reduce time for non-value added   
          tasks  
       D4311: maintenance procedure  
       D4312: maintenance center design 
D432: faster transportation  
               
 
                                                                                   (3.25) 
 
                                                                               (3.26) 
 
 
Design map for axiomatic design of „Maintenance Management‟ is shown by Figure 
3.8.
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Figure 3.8. Design mapping for maintenance management
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4.  CONCLUSION  
As long as there is a conflict of any kind, and weapons are being used by the parties, the 
military is the only organization that can secure interests. In war, the victory does not 
always go to those having the largest army or the most sophisticated equipment. It 
goes to who has more efficient strategic plan. Strategy considers all the components 
of national power: economic, political, socio-psychological and military. At the 
beginning of WWII, both French and British had tanks superior to those used by the 
Panzer Divisions. However the Germans knew how to employ their weapons. As 
another example Iraqi  war can be given. Although USA forces were more 
sophisticated, it is hard to tell about a victory. So everything depends on strategic 
plan: when, where and with what forces a battle is to be delivered; in other words on 
logistics how and where to locate.  
In this study, it is aimed to develop military logistics network via axiomatic design 
principles. In the first part of the study, military logistics definitions are given and it 
is told how military logistics reached its current form. In the second part, axiomatic 
design principles and a brief literature review in supply chain is told. On the third 
part, in order to be as an example, US military logistics transformation is given. 
Especially new terms and methods are told.  
 
During logistics network design, it is divided to 4 steps:  acquisition, storage, 
distribution and maintenance.  
As seen during study, in acquisition it is important to buy products in required 
amount and desired features to minimum cost at the right time. Cost includes 
variable product costs, shipping cost and fixed costs. In order to decrease cost, 
consolidation, outsourcing or any step that will decrease demand can be used. Price 
analysis should be made and inventory visibility should be maintained. In 
acquisition, besides cost, it is important to buy products in desired features- desired 
quantity and quality. Demand quantity depends on safety stock in peace time and 
probability of war. Quality not only depends on what is available in the market but 
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also depends on enemy‟s‟ quality standards. Forecasting, spying and updating 
product information are necessities. In order to buy products at the right time order-
management procedures should be developed and lead time should be decreased.  
 
Second design step is storage. For strategic mobility framework, some equipment 
should be prepositioned. Instead of long movement of needed equipment, by 
prepositioning it allows combat-ready forces. Managing inventory is one of the key 
features of logistics. Inventory management includes minimization of costs and 
maximization of usage of inventory. Profit maximization and risk minimization 
strategies should be developed to better management. In order to minimize costs, 
fixed costs including fixed assets and administration& selling costs should be 
decreased; inventory levels and movement of inventory in depots should be 
minimized by eliminating non-value added functions as much as possible, inventory 
accuracy and developing inventory allocation strategy. Inventory level minimization 
means minimization in depot inventory, minimization of non-stable inventory (under 
maintenance and in-transit), clarification of pre-positioned equipment quantity and 
minimization of in-theater inventory. Another concern in storage design is to keep 
assets in safe and good conditions.  
Third design step is distribution design. The military distribution system has two 
distinct segments: strategic-national and theater. The strategic-national segment 
consists of moving supplies from points outside a theater of military operations into 
the theater. The theater segment consists of distribution that occurs within a theater 
of military operations. In distribution it is aimed to increase efficiency and decrease 
risk of failure. Performance indicators for transportation are throughput 
maximization, time definite delivery, cost minimization and flexibility. Fundamental 
economic principles impacting transportation economy are economy of scale and 
economy of distance. Transportation costs are driven by distance, volume, density, 
stowability -how product case dimensions fit into transportation equipment-, 
handling, and liability. By flexibility, it is aimed to define a transportation mode 
having high maneuverability, large freight volume, can be used in all weather and 
climatic condition.  In order to increase efficiency transportation methods should be 
optimized. Transportation optimization methods are consolidation, outsourcing, route 
optimization and selecting right transportation mode based on product features, 
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quantity and critique. Another important point in distribution is to decide shipping 
priorities: which one, in which order, what quantity, in which conditions, what 
frequency. To solve the problem shipping procedures should be developed based on 
defined criteria.   
The last design step is maintenance design. Maintenance is an important aspect of 
military logistics and includes those activities needed to keep weapons, vehicles, and 
other materiel in an operable condition; to restore them to a serviceable condition 
when necessary; or to improve their usefulness through modifications. The Army 
calls maintenance as reset as the repair, recapitalization and replacement of 
equipment to equip units preparing for deployment and improve next-to-deploy 
unit‟s equipment on hand levels. In order to have a customer satisfied maintenance 
function, total cost, risk and required time should be decreased. Cost for repairing are 
shipping, material and personnel costs. Outsourcing, consolidation and decrease 
breakdown-frequency can reduce costs. Speed and the accuracy of repair are other 
issues.   Figure 4.1 shows the whole design process on the next page.  
The weak parts of the study are its assumptions. It is assumed that: 
 All geographical conditions are known. 
 There is no source restriction. 
  War is conventional. 
 Material logistics is designed.  
 Outbound logistics is studied.  
For further studies, logistics can be designed to a special geography. Money, men 
and time restrictions should be added. Nowadays wars are generally unconventional. 
So designing a peer-to-peer war is just the first step. Military logistics does not only 
include material logistics but also human logistics and facility logistics. These items 
should be integrated to the system. Military logistics includes 2 parts: outbound and 
in-theater. In-theater logistics network is absolutely a different design and should be  
studied separately.
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Figure 4.1. Design mapping for logistics network
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